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Abstract Existing accounts of cognitive artefacts are a useful starting point for de-
veloping the emerging notion of situated affectivity. Starting from a recent taxonomy 
of cognitive artefacts, I propose a taxonomy of material affective scaffolds (material 
objects that we use to support, shape and more generally regulate our affective states). 
I distinguish representational material affective scaffolds (divided into iconic, indexi-
cal and symbolic ones) from nonrepresentational ones (chemical and sensory ones). I 
conclude by pointing out that the resulting taxonomy is based not only on properties of 
objects but also on the user’s stance towards objects, which in turn depends on other 
contextual factors.
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1 Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about cognitive artefacts, de-
fined as
physical objects made by humans for the purposes of aiding, en-
hancing, or improving cognition. (Hutchins 1999, 126)1
These include compasses, maps, calculators, clocks and many more. 
Cognitive artefacts are often said to ‘make us smarter’ because they 
enable us to solve problems we would otherwise not be able to solve 
(or only with much greater effort).
The notion of cognitive artefact has been used in philosophy of cog-
nitive science to argue that cognition is not brain-bound but situated 
in the world. Cognitive artefacts can be characterized more gener-
ally as cognitive ‘scaffolds’: environmental supports with which we 
interact, and through which we enhance our planning and problem-
solving skills (Sterelny 2010). Supporters of the so-called ‘extend-
ed-cognition thesis’ even regard some cognitive artefacts as consti-
tuting cognition (Clark, Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary 2010).
Comparatively less has been written on how artefacts help us have 
experiences we would otherwise not be able to have (or only with 
much difficulty) – such as emotional and, more generally affective, 
experiences.2 This situation is changing rapidly, however. Over the 
last decade, various philosophers have started to argue that affec-
tive states, too, are environmentally situated.3 In a recent paper, Pi-
redda draws explicitly on the literature on cognitive artefacts to dis-
cuss ‘affective artefacts’, which she defines
tentatively […] as objects that have the capacity to alter the affec-
tive condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an impor-
tant role in defining that agent’s self. (Piredda 2019, 1)
Her discussion overlaps in part with Colombetti and Krueger’s (2015), 
who analyse how both material objects and people can function as ‘af-
fective scaffolds’ in the context of activities of what they call ‘affec-
tive niche construction’.
1 See also Norman 1991; Kirsh 2010; Heersmink 2013; Casati 2018.
2 I use the term ‘affective’ here to refer not only to emotions, but also moods and mo-
tivational drives such as pain, pleasure, fatigue and so on. For the difference between 
emotions and moods, see e.g. Stephan 2017.
3 Griffiths, Scarantino 2009; Krueger 2014a, 2014b; Stephan, Walter, Wilutzky 2014; 
Colombetti, Krueger 2015; Colombetti, Roberts 2015; Roberts 2015; Colombetti 2016; 
Krueger, Szanto 2016; Piredda 2019; Candiotto, Piredda 2019; Saarinen 2020.
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My aim in this paper is to add a further piece to this emerging lit-
erature by continuing to unpack and develop the view that we use ma-
terial objects to scaffold our affective states. I prefer to talk of objects 
as affective ‘scaffolds’ rather than ‘artefacts’ because, even though 
the majority of affective scaffolds I discuss below are indeed artefacts 
(human-made objects), the notion of ‘scaffolds’ is broader and includes 
also naturally occurring objects. My aim, specifically, is to distinguish 
different types of ‘material’4 affective scaffolds more systematically 
than done so far. This work is needed not only to catch up with the lit-
erature on cognitive scaffolds but also to further our understanding 
of how the human mind, in its experiential and affective dimension, 
is shaped and structured by the environment – an important step in 
continuing the ‘4E’ project of challenging the widespread view that 
the machinery of the mind is entirely or even primarily in the head.
In what follows I begin by presenting Heersmink’s (2013) taxono-
my of cognitive artefacts (§ 2). Then I apply it to affective scaffolds, 
tweaking it along the way as I see fit. I distinguish representational 
and nonrepresentational affective scaffolds, dividing them into fur-
ther taxa: iconic, indexical and symbolic scaffolds (§ 3), and psycho-
active and sensory ones (§ 4), respectively. In section 5 I reflect on 
the resulting taxonomy, comparing it with Heersmink’s and clarify-
ing how it should be interpreted as part of the broader project of an-
alysing the phenomenon of affective scaffolding.
2 Heersmink’s Taxonomy of Cognitive Artefacts
Among existing discussions of cognitive artefacts is Heersmink’s 
(2013) taxonomy, which is influenced by Peirce’s theory of signs and 
Kirsh’s (1995) notion of ‘intelligent use of space’. Heersmink offers 
this taxonomy as
a first step towards a better understanding of the range and vari-
ety of cognitive artifacts (2013, 465)
and as a
point of departure, both for conceptualizing how different artifacts 
augment or impair cognitive performance and how they trans-
form and are integrated into our cognitive system and practic-
es. (2013, 465)
4 As in Colombetti, Krueger 2015, I use ‘material’ to denote objects rather than peo-
ple. People are material too, of course, but it is not uncommon to use ‘material’ to re-
fer specifically to objects – as in ‘material culture studies’.
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He begins by distinguishing the two broad genera of ‘representation-
al’ and ‘nonrepresentational’ cognitive artefacts. He notes that most 
existing accounts of cognitive artefacts characterize them primarily 
as representational – namely, as aiding cognition in virtue of refer-
ring to, or being about, something else (as in the case of maps and 
written text) (e.g. Norman 1991; Nersessian 2005; Casati 2018). Yet, 
he adds, cognitive artefacts can also be ‘nonrepresentational’ when 
they aid cognition without referring to anything else.
Heersmink further divides these two genera into ‘species’. Draw-
ing broadly on Peirce’s semeiotic, he divides representational cogni-
tive artefacts into ‘iconic’, ‘indexical’ and ‘symbolic’ ones. Iconic ar-
tefacts, he claims, represent in virtue of being highly isomorphic with 
what they refer to (as in the case of maps and knitting patterns). In-
dexical artefacts represent in virtue of having a direct causal connec-
tion with the objects they refer to (as in the case of the length of the 
mercury column of a thermometer, which represents temperature; 
or the direction of a flag, which represents the direction of the wind). 
Symbolic artefacts represent in virtue of “shared use, agreement, 
and logical rules” (Heersmink 2013, 474) (as in the case of written 
words or mathematical notations). Still following Peirce, Heersmink 
notes that most artefacts represent in more than one way at the same 
time. For example, a flag is also iconic, as there is an isomorphism 
between its direction and that of the wind. Nevertheless, Heersmink 
thinks it is useful to characterize token artefacts as ‘predominantly’ 
iconic, indexical or symbolic (see also Atkin 2008).5
Drawing mainly on Kirsh (1995), Heersmink then divides nonrep-
resentational cognitive artefacts into ‘spatial’ and ‘structural’ ones. 
Spatial artefacts aid cognition in virtue of their location in space. 
One uses space intelligently when, for example, one consistently plac-
es one’s car keys in the same place at home, so that one will know 
where they are without having to look for them each time; or when 
one places the article one intends to read next on top of a pile of oth-
er papers. Structural cognitive artefacts, on their part, aid cognition 
in virtue of their (concrete or virtual) structure – as when Scrabble 
players rearrange letter tiles to recall words more easily, or when 
Tetris players rotate virtual zooids to find the orientation that best 
5 An early account of this tripartition can be found in Peirce (1867). Peirce’s theory of 
signs is notoriously difficult and complex, partly because for forty years he kept modify-
ing it (Liszka 1996; Atkin 2013). As the aim of this section is to summarize Heersmink’s 
taxonomy, I won’t engage with the subtleties of Peirce’s semeiotic here, nor question 
Heersmink’s interpretation of Peirce. It is worth at least briefly stressing, however, that 
according to Peirce index, icon and symbol are not three separate entities but rather mo-
dalities of semeiotic functioning that are always present together in all kinds of signs. A 
taxonomy of objects rigidly based on separate semeiotic categories is thus arguably not 
in line with Peirce’s intentions (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out).
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fits the socket at the bottom of the computer screen. The resulting 
taxonomy is summarised in figure 1.
3 Representational Affective Scaffolds
Whether what Heersmink calls ‘spatial’ and ‘structural’ cognitive ar-
tefacts are in fact nonrepresentational has been questioned (Fasoli 
2018). As I discuss in the next section, in my view those two catego-
ries are indeed problematic and should be dropped. Accordingly, it 
may well be that cognitive artefacts, when defined as human-made 
tools with specific functions, are such mostly, or even only, because 
they represent something. For present purposes, however, we need 
not worry about this issue. What I want to draw attention to, instead, 
is that the representational vs. nonrepresentational distinction can 
be applied to affective material scaffolds, allowing us to say some-
thing important about them: namely, that whereas some objects in-
fluence our affective states (or, more succinctly, ‘affect us’ or just ‘af-
fect’) because they refer to something else, others do so in virtue of 
their material properties as such. In this section I look in more detail 
at the first case, and in the next section at the second.
Heersmink’s Peircean tripartition into iconic, indexical and sym-
bolic cognitive artefacts can be applied to affective scaffolds. We can 
thus distinguish:
• iconic affective scaffolds, which affect in virtue of resembling 
something else;
Figure 1 Heersmink’s taxonomy of cognitive artefacts (adapted from Heersmink 2013, 473)
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• indexical affective scaffolds, which affect in virtue of being 
causally connected with something else;
• symbolic affective scaffolds, which affect in virtue of referring 
to something else by convention.
Good examples of iconic affective scaffolds are pictures or paintings 
of loved ones, and more generally of personally significant people, 
places or even objects. Sounds and music can also affect people icon-
ically, for example when they imitate nature (e.g. streams, wind or 
bird songs). Of course, anything can resemble anything else along 
some dimension; there is indeed a complex debate on whether ico-
nicity or resemblance is sufficient, or even necessary, for representa-
tion (e.g. Goldman 2003). As I clarify in section 5, my suggestion ulti-
mately will be to interpret this classification as capturing how people 
interpret objects as part of affective scaffolding activities. From this 
user- (rather than object-) based perspective, what makes an object 
an iconic affective scaffold is that it affects one based on some re-
semblance that person perceives. Likewise, as I shall discuss, for in-
dexical and symbolic affective scaffolds.
Indexical affective scaffolds include objects that affect one because 
they remind one of some past event, person or situation of which the 
object in question was a consequence. These objects correspond to 
what Heersmink, in a different paper, calls “autobiographical objects” 
(Heersmink 2018; see also Turkle 2007). Examples abound – from hol-
iday souvenirs, to mementos of a first date or an adventurous trip, 
to objects that belonged to deceased loved ones, to music one used 
to listen to with someone or that was played by someone who affect-
ed one in some way. The experiences elicited by these objects can be 
nostalgia and longing for the past event, person or situation; or they 
can be re-enactments of past feelings (awe in front of a certain land-
scape, love and attraction for a certain person, and so on). Note that 
autobiographical objects may affect also in virtue of iconic features. 
For example, a magnet in the shape of the Eiffel Tower may affect me 
in virtue of its resemblance to the actual Eiffel Tower. Holiday souve-
nirs, however, typically affect because the person herself buys them 
when on holiday, i.e. because of a certain existential connection or 
“correspondence in fact” (one of Peirce’s characterization of indices; 
see Peirce 1867, 294; see also Atkin 2005). A magnet in the shape of 
the Eiffel Tower will not affect me in the same way if it is something 
I bought myself just after climbing up the Eiffel Tower (say), or if it is 
a gift from a friend and I have never even been in Paris (see also § 5).
Indexical affective scaffolds also include objects that affect us be-
cause they are given to us by someone as signs of gratitude or love. 
My grandmother used to knit scarves and sweaters for me, and to give 
them to me saying “This is for my dearest granddaughter with all my 
love”. Thus, those objects touch me because, as products of my grand-
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mother’s love for me, they remind me of such love. Thank-you cards 
and other gifts can work in the same way. They are the consequence, 
or expression, of feelings of gratitude; as such, they work as indexes 
of those feelings and can thus function as indexical affective scaffolds.
The class of symbolic affective scaffolds is particularly vast and 
complex. Innumerable objects affect us because they refer to some-
thing else by convention. A simple example is the wedding ring, which 
can strengthen one’s feelings of connection with one’s spouse as a 
symbol of commitment and faithfulness. More complex examples in-
clude objects employed in religious practices and various types of art-
works (paintings, sculptures, music etc.). Religious practices make 
ample use of symbolic material objects for the purpose of affective 
transformation. There are innumerable examples: crosses, golden 
and silver objects, incense, labyrinths, candles, relics and more. The 
characterization of religious symbols as affective scaffolds fits well 
with Geertz’s (1973) definition of religion as a system of symbols 
(including material objects) aimed at “[establishing] powerful, per-
vasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations” (Geertz 1973, 90). 
Geertz importantly emphasizes the ritualistic-performative dimen-
sion of religion, attributing a double role to it. On the one hand, it 
is during rituals that religious symbols acquire their specific mean-
ings, and/or that those meanings are reinforced. On the other hand, 
rituals are means through which meanings become psychologically 
inscribed or internalized, determining long-term dispositions to feel 
and behave in certain ways. As Geertz writes, the “concrete sym-
bols” of a religion
[induce] in the worshipper a certain distinctive set of dispositions 
(tendencies, capacities, propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, 
pronenesses) which lend a chronic character to the flow of his ac-
tivity and the quality of his experience. (1973, 95)
For Geertz, religious symbols are in fact tools that enable, and even 
instruct, people how to feel – and, importantly, how to feel ‘specifi-
cally’. Through its distinctive symbols, each religion gives specific 
direction, order and form to what would otherwise be chaotic or un-
canny experiences.
As one concrete example out of many possible ones, let us consid-
er the Easter Vigil service in the Roman Catholic tradition. This ser-
vice takes place in the hours of darkness before Easter Sunday. It 
begins outside the church, where the congregation gathers around 
a fire. The priest blesses the fire and uses it to light the Paschal can-
dle, into which he also inscribes a cross and other symbols. At this 
stage he speaks the words: “May the light of Christ rising in glory 
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dispel the darkness of our hearts and minds”.6 A deacon then car-
ries the candle into the church through the central nave, in dark-
ness, followed by a procession of people holding unlit candles. Once 
in the church he raises up the Paschal candle three times while sing-
ing “The light of Christ”. As he proceeds, those attending the service 
gradually light their candles from the Paschal candle. As the latter is 
finally placed in the middle of the sanctuary, the lights of the church 
are switched on. This part of the service is followed by the singing 
of the Proclamation, which includes explicit references to darkness 
and light; for example:
This is the night that with a pillar of fire banished the darkness 
of sin […] This is the night, when Christ broke the prison-bars of 
death and rose victorious from the underworld […] Christ your Son, 
who, coming back from death’s domain, has shed his peaceful light 
on humanity, and lives and reigns for ever and ever.
During this service, the words spoken by the priest indicate that 
light produced by fire symbolizes Christ and his power to dispel sin 
and death, in turn symbolized by darkness. The service can thus be 
seen as a performance intended to communicate the idea that Christ 
has the power to redeem humanity without weakening (just as the 
fire from the Paschal candle can illuminate the small individual can-
dles without dimming) and that through his resurrection humanity 
is saved (light spreads and defeats darkness). It is clear that the ser-
vice aims to induce an affective transformation in the participants. 
It is theatrical, and uses darkness and light not just to represent and 
convey the concept of salvation through Christ’s resurrection but also 
to touch and move the congregation. Over the course of the service, 
attendees are meant to experience the uplifting power of light as it 
overcomes darkness. They move from the gloomy and lonely atmos-
phere of unlit spaces, where they cannot see or interact with other 
participants, to the welcoming and uplifting atmosphere of the fully 
lit church, and a renewed sense of togetherness. The sensory quali-
ties of darkness and light clearly play an important role in facilitat-
ing this affective transformation (see § 4). Yet knowledge of their sym-
bolic meaning, explicated and underscored by the words uttered by 
the priest during the service, further enhances their affective power.
When it comes to art, some objects are more deliberately symbol-
ic than others. European paintings from various historical periods 
are loaded with symbols that influence how the perceiver interprets 
the painting and, relatedly, how the painting affects the perceiver. 
This is also why knowing the symbolic meaning of objects portrayed 
6 For the description of the service I followed Catholic Truth Society 2012, 311-21.
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in this type of art can add greatly to the perceiver’s experience. Con-
sider for example the painting Still Life with Cherries in China Bowls 
by the Flemish artist Osias Beert (1580-1624) [fig. 2].
This work depicts various objects on a table, including a bread 
roll, an oil lamp, a dragonfly, a knife, a bowl of strawberries and one 
of cherries. A naïve viewer who looks at this painting without aware-
ness of its symbolic meanings will probably be affected primarily by 
its light, colours and shapes. When I first saw this painting as such a 
naïve viewer, I was attracted in particular by the vivid red of the fruit 
and the realistic qualities of the bread, especially by comparison with 
the gloomy darkness of the background. I only briefly noted the insect 
and knife in the foreground, and thought they were there mainly just 
to enhance the realism of the scene. I then read that the cherries and 
strawberries are meant to represent the souls of human beings, and 
the dragonfly the devil waiting to corrupt them (Pound 2018). This in-
formation significantly changed my affective response to the paint-
ing. Now, when I watch it, I see the previously seemingly insignificant 
dragonfly as ominous. Its stillness and apparently accidental presence 
creates an affective tension as I imaginatively anticipate it starting 
to lift and fly threateningly over the fruits. The redness of the fruit is 
not attractive or pleasing anymore. Rather, it bears disturbing asso-
ciations with guilt and existential suffering (and even blood), making 
me think of the damned souls in the burning red flames of Dante’s In-
ferno. Awareness of the symbolic meanings of the painting has thus 
considerably changed its impact on my affective experience.
Much more could be said, of course, about the affective impact of 
symbols in art – not just in painting but also sculpture, music, the-
atre, and so on. And there are other domains where symbols are 
Figure 2 Osias Beert. Still Life with Cherries in China Bowls. 1608
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explicitly created and used to influence our affective states, such 
as branding and advertising. Yet hopefully these few examples are 
enough to illustrate the general point that objects can be symbolic 
affective scaffolds.
4 Nonrepresentational Affective Scaffolds
It is clear that many objects also affect without referring to anything 
else, and can thus be characterized as ‘nonrepresentational’ affective 
scaffolds. How can we analyse these further? Heersmink’s (2013) tax-
onomy, in this case, does not seem useful. Arguably, this is because 
his distinction between spatial and structural cognitive artefacts is 
problematic to begin with. First, structure, after all, exists in space. 
When we say that objects have a certain structure we refer to how 
their parts are organized in space. When we rearrange Scrabble tiles 
to facilitate word retrieval, we rearrange those tiles in space. Indeed, 
in Kirsh’s (1995) paper (from which Heersmink draws), the examples 
of rearranging Scrabble tiles and of leaving the car keys in the same 
spot are both meant to illustrate the same phenomenon – the intelli-
gent use of space. Second, it does not seem appropriate either to talk 
of ‘spatial cognitive artefacts’. What Kirsh originally emphasized is 
that, more often than we may think, we arrange and move objects in 
space to simplify our planning and problem-solving tasks. In order 
to capture this phenomenon, it seems more accurate to talk, for ex-
ample, of the ‘use in space’ we sometimes make of objects to solve 
problems (rather than to categorize objects in some contexts as ‘spa-
tial cognitive artefacts’).
Given that this part of Heersmink’s taxonomy is problematic, I pro-
pose to drop it and to divide nonrepresentational affective scaffolds 
instead into ‘psychoactive’ and ‘sensory’ ones. By ‘psychoactive scaf-
folds’ I refer to items that users introduce in their body because of 
their global effects on consciousness (such as changes in mood, or 
increased alertness or relaxation). By ‘sensory scaffolds’ I refer to 
objects that affect users in virtue of sensory qualities and accompa-
nying hedonic tone.
Prototypical psychoactive affective scaffolds are psychoactive (or 
‘psychotropic’) substances, called this way because they induce al-
tered states of consciousness. Many of us regularly introduce into our 
organism a variety of these substances (from caffeine to nicotine and 
alcohol, to antidepressants, anxiolytics, and illegal drugs) to be more 
or less alert, relaxed, optimistic, joyful, euphoric, and so on. Humans 
have consumed these substances since prehistoric times, and today 
we know that their consciousness-altering function depends on the 
specific action of a variety of neurotransmitters (e.g. dopamine, sero-
tonin, norepinephrine) at synaptic level. These substances influence 
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our affective state without referring to anything else (although they 
can, and often are, incorporated into practices which attribute e.g. 
symbolic meanings to them; see below). Importantly, I understand the 
class of psychoactive affective scaffolds broadly, to include objects 
containing substances that are not standardly defined in physiology 
as ‘psychoactive’, but that also lead to alterations in consciousness (es-
pecially in mood and energy level) when inserted into the organism. 
Foods containing simple carbs (sugars, refined grains etc.) are good 
examples. Eating these foods leads to an experience of increased en-
ergy (due to a rapid increase in glucose). More generally, our moti-
vational drives often depend on the organism’s need to maintain ho-
meostasis; hence we drink when thirsty, eat when hungry etc. The 
substances we take in response to these drives can affect us (e.g. by 
giving a sense of satisfaction and restoring good mood) and as such 
fall into the category of psychoactive affective scaffolds.
Sensory affective scaffolds include all sorts of objects that influ-
ence our affective states through their sensory qualities – colours, 
pitches, tastes, scents, textures, and so on. Sensory qualities are ex-
perienced through the senses.7 The most obvious way in which they af-
fect us is through their hedonic character – their felt pleasantness or 
unpleasantness. Why and how we find some sensory qualities pleas-
ant or unpleasant is a complex empirical question (e.g. Miskovic, An-
derson 2018). Staying at the phenomenological level, it seems that 
when we find sensory qualities pleasant or unpleasant, we experi-
ence their hedonic character ‘together with’ the sensory quality it-
self (e.g. we experience a certain scent ‘as’ pleasant). This is most 
evident in the case of scents and tastes, but arguably also applies 
to colours, sounds etc. Given that hedonic tone is typically regard-
ed as a dimension of mood (e.g. Russell 2003), pleasantness/unpleas-
antness is likely to influence mood (see Herz 2009, for instance, for 
evidence that scents experienced as pleasant/unpleasant improve/
worsen mood). Generally speaking, seeing pleasant sights, tasting 
pleasant tastes, smelling pleasant scents, and so on, will increase a 
person’s overall ‘positive affect’ and thus incline her toward a more 
positive mood (feeling good, happy, uplifted, content); vice versa for 
unpleasant hedonic tone. In addition, arguably sensory qualities can 
also affect in more specific ways (which will often depend on the type 
of object involved): they can, in various degrees and combinations, 
stimulate, energize, uplift, relax, bore, arouse, surprise, comfort, 
please, annoy, fascinate, absorb, attract, repel, disgust, seduce, and 
7 For convenience, in this paper I follow ordinary language here and say that we ex-
perience, or perceive, colours, sounds, tastes etc. I do not, however, endorse the ob-
jectivist view that sensory qualities exist independently of the perceiver. My preferred 
view is that sensory qualities are ‘enacted’ in the encounter of the perceiver and the 
perceived (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991; Thompson 1995).
JOLMA e-ISSN 2723-9640
1, 2, 2020, 215-236
226
so on. Overall, it seems correct to say that objects can affect us non-
representationally in virtue of their sensory properties qua sensory 
properties (namely, without the user taking the sensory properties 
to refer to or indicate something else) – as when my mood is lifted 
by smelling a rose or a freshly baked loaf of bread, or when I am se-
duced by a luminous shade of dark cobalt blue in the sky, just before 
darkness. As such, these objects are best characterized as nonrep-
resentational affective scaffolds.
Importantly, because we typically experience objects through 
more than one sense at once, objects may affect us in different ways 
at the same time, generating quite complex sensory-related affective 
states. Pizza, for example, has a certain scent and taste but also col-
our, texture and even sound (compare the sound of a crisp thin Ro-
man-style pizza with that of a gooey thick Chicago-style one). Each 
of these properties individually considered can affect. Yet, when one 
eats pizza, these sensory properties are combined together, generat-
ing a complex affective experience. This point applies to eating any 
other food, of course, and generalizes to other activities and their 
combinations. Every moment of consciousness arguably usually in-
volves a multisensory experience. As I type these words I feel the 
keys under my fingers, hear the noise the keys make when pressed, 
and see the rest of the screen and its background.8
One may want to question the distinction between psychoac-
tive and sensory affective scaffolds by pointing out that some sens-
es – taste and smell – are characterized as ‘chemical senses’. Unlike 
sight and hearing, taste and smell involve contact between chemical 
molecules in the environment and (chemo)receptors in the tongue 
and nasal cavity.9 In fact, touch is also in part a chemical sense, as 
it can involve the chemical activation of nerve endings in soft tissue 
(chemesthesis), giving rise to sensations of stinging, tingling, cooling 
and burning (Smith 2015). It may thus seem that the distinction be-
tween sensory and psychoactive affective scaffolds does not hold be-
cause scents, flavours and psychoactive scaffolds all affect one in vir-
tue of processes involving chemical substances and chemoreception.
I do not think this consideration undermines the distinction. Con-
ceptually and experientially, there is a clear difference between per-
ceiving sensory qualities through exteroception (a process which, in 
8 I am considering here only sensory stimuli that are consciously perceived. How-
ever, we can also be affected by sensory stimuli that are only subliminally perceived. 
For example there is evidence that our affective state is influenced by odorants that 
are not consciously perceived (Sela, Sobel 2010). This may be due to the nature of the 
odorant, learnt associations and/or the psychoactive properties of some odorants (see 
below, main text).
9 For an accessible introduction to sensory physiology, see Widmaier, Raff, Strang 2014, 
ch. 7.
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the case of smell and taste, happens to involve chemoreception rath-
er than e.g. photoreception) and undergoing alterations in conscious-
ness due to the insertion into the organism of substances that alter 
neurotransmission in the brain, but are not sensed. In fact, the dis-
tinction is also valid at the physiological level: chemoreception is in-
volved in both cases, but in the case of taste and smell the processes 
that define those senses as ‘chemical’ occur in the sensory organs, 
whereas in the case of psychotropic drugs they occur in the brain.
To clarify the difference further, consider coffee. Coffee possesses 
chemical components that stimulate bitter taste receptors (primari-
ly located on the tongue). This process is mainly responsible for the 
sensed bitterness of coffee. Among the components of coffee is caf-
feine, which apparently contributes only minimally to bitterness, yet 
acts on the central nervous system as a psychoactive substance (it 
binds with adenosine receptors in the brain, blocking the absorption 
of adenosine – an inhibitory neurotransmitter which reduces heart 
rate and promotes sleep) (Poole, Tordoff 2017). When one drinks cof-
fee to feel less sleepy and improve concentration, it is the psycho-
active properties of caffeine that one exploits, and coffee thus func-
tions as a psychoactive affective scaffold. When, on the other hand, 
one drinks coffee because one likes its taste, then coffee functions 
as a sensory affective scaffold.10
Thus it is not that the distinction between psychoactive and sen-
sory affective scaffolds does not hold, but rather that certain items 
can function both as sensory and psychoactive affective scaffolds. In-
cense is another example. Smelling incense involves the detection of 
chemical molecules through chemoreceptors in the nose. When this 
scent is experienced as pleasant and used to create a pleasant envi-
ronment, we can say that the incense functions as a sensory affec-
tive scaffold: it is its scent, as sensed and liked, that affects. Howev-
er, incense also contains molecules that make it into a psychoactive 
substance. In a study on mice, Moussaieff et al. (2008) showed that 
incensole acetate (a component of incense) has anxiolytic and anti-
depressant effects, and suggested that this is why incense is used 
widely across cultures in religious rituals. If this is right, incense al-
so works as a psychoactive affective scaffold.
10 How one comes to enjoy the bitterness of coffee is a difficult question (Poole, Tor-
doff 2017). Given that bitterness is usually disliked (it typically is in children and most 
animal species) because it is associated with toxic substances, one possibility is that it 
is the uplifting effect of caffeine that, by association and anticipation, makes one like 
and seek coffee. Even so, however, I would still say that the bitterness of coffee, when 
enjoyed, is best regarded as a sensory affective scaffold – because it is the ‘sensed bit-
terness’ that is enjoyed (note also that whereas the sensation of bitterness is immedi-
ate, the pick-up induced by caffeine takes longer to kick in – from 10 to 45 minutes). 
Analogous considerations apply to the following example of incense, in the main text.
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A more interesting complication is that psychoactive and senso-
ry scaffolds are often integrated into practices that associate them 
with cultural meanings, and thereby also count as representational 
affective scaffolds. Coffee is again a good example, and wine an even 
better one. One may drink wine because of its pleasant sensory qual-
ities and/or its psychoactive effects (in which case wine works as a 
nonrepresentational affective scaffold). But the drinker may also be 
a connoisseur who associates the wine with a specific vintage and 
terroir. These elements will add further layers to the affective expe-
rience accompanying wine drinking. Wine in the case of the connois-
seur is not just a nonrepresentational psychoactive scaffold, but also 
a representational one (mainly an indexical one).
More complex examples are entheogen substances (psychoactive 
substances used for spiritual goals) used in collective rituals – such 
as the ayahuasca ritual performed by people in the Amazon (Labate, 
Cavnar 2014). These substances are attributed symbolic meanings 
that add up to their affective scaffolding power. In the case of the pe-
yote cactus that grows in Central America, its primary psychoactive 
ingredient is mescaline, and the most commonly reported effects of its 
ingestion are visual and auditory hallucinations, feelings of content-
ment, wellbeing and calmness, and muscle relaxation. These effects 
make the cactus into a nonrepresentational affective scaffold. How-
ever, the peyote also has various cultural symbolic meanings. Users 
generally believe that it allows them to communicate directly with a 
spiritual realm of existence (Issitt, Main 2014). Many Native Ameri-
cans regard the cactus as a medicine with God-given properties, and 
as an omniscient and compassionate personality or spirit. It is also 
called ‘Mother Peyote’ or ‘Father Peyote’, and is associated with sym-
bols of origin, dawn and birth (Calabrese 1994). These associations 
make the peyote into (also) a representational affective scaffold.11
5 Why Taxonomize?
Having gone through the exercise of applying Heersmink’s approach 
to affective scaffolds, I now want to pause to reflect on what has been 
achieved. Prima facie, what we now have is a taxonomy of material af-
fective scaffolds [fig. 3] that broadly mirrors the one of cognitive ar-
tefacts presented in section 2.
Importantly, however, I regard this taxonomy differently from how 
Heersmink’s regards his. He explicitly presents his approach as “ar-
11 More could be said about this topic, especially about how one arguably needs to 
learn to use psychoactive substances in social-ritual contexts to be affected in the de-
sired way (Becker 1953).
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tifact-centered” (2013, 472) to offset the prevailing anthropocentrism 
of others’ categorizations. As he writes:
I take as my point of departure the specific properties of cognitive 
artifacts and then categorize them on the basis of those proper-
ties, not on the properties or goals of the agents that design, make, 
or use them. (Heersmink 2013, 472)
His taxonomy arguably captures salient features of objects that may 
explain why they are typically used the way they are. Yet entirely to 
bracket the user and her goals seems to me problematic, especially if 
the aim is not just to analyse objects per se but objects that are used 
in mind-altering or mind-supporting activities. Affective scaffolding, 
as characterized by Colombetti and Krueger (2015), is indeed such 
an activity: it is a form of affective regulation that involves not just 
processes of ‘internal’ cognitive reorganization (distraction, re-ap-
praisal, evaluation of coping potential; Gross 2015) but also object-in-
volving activities (see also Krueger 2014a). As I see it, the main dis-
tinction between representational and nonrepresentational items is 
useful precisely because it captures the important general fact that, 
in the context of such activities, the user may or may not take an ‘in-
terpretive stance’ towards objects. When she does, we can charac-
terize the item as a representational scaffold; when she does not, as 
a nonrepresentational scaffold. The user’s stance in the context of a 
specific affective scaffolding activity thus contributes to determin-
ing the object’s position in the taxonomy.
Thus, iconic, indexical and symbolic scaffolds are such because of 
how the user interprets them. When a person uses an object to influ-
ence her affective state because of some similarity she perceives be-
tween that object and something else, that object is (for her) an icon-
ic affective scaffold. In my view, this is why the notion of an iconic 
Figure 3 A taxonomy of affective scaffolds
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affective scaffold is useful in the first place: it explains why the user 
relates to an object (for the purposes of affective regulation) in the 
way she does – that is, it is a category for phenomenological descrip-
tion and psychological explanation. Likewise, I take the notion of an 
indexical affective scaffold to refer to an object that a person uses be-
cause she sees a certain causal connection between that object and 
something else. Likewise, too, for symbolic affective scaffolds, which 
I regard as such because of some arbitrary connection the user per-
ceives or establishes between them and something else.
Of course, the user can be wrong or idiosyncratic in her interpreta-
tion of the object. She could be mistaken in seeing, say, a causal con-
nection where in fact there is none. For example, she might value her 
scarf because she thinks it was knitted by her beloved grandmoth-
er when in fact, unbeknownst to her, it was not (say the scarf has no 
connection at all to her grandmother). The scarf, in other words, is 
not an index of her grandmother. Still, for the purposes of phenom-
enological description and psychological explanation, it is useful to 
say that, for the person, the object functions as an indexical affective 
scaffold. This notion captures how the person sees/feels the object, 
and relatedly why she values it and uses it to regulate her affect. Sim-
ilarly, if a person values an object and uses it to regulate her affec-
tive state on the basis of a resemblance only she perceives between 
the object and something else, again the suggestion here is that the 
object counts as an iconic affective scaffold (even though, it might be 
argued, it is not an icon). Likewise for symbolic affective scaffolds.12
On the nonrepresentational side of the taxonomy, properties of 
objects are more relevant in determining what kind of affective scaf-
fold an object is. Psychoactive and sensory scaffolds can affect just 
in virtue of their physical properties, without the user taking an in-
terpretive stance. Of course, the user needs to be sensitive to those 
objects for them to affect her (colour is not calming for a blind per-
son; coffee is not a pick up for someone not sensitive to the psychoac-
tive effects of caffeine), and this sensitivity may in turn vary with con-
text and even with the user’s goals and intentions. Nevertheless, the 
main point is that, in order to affect, nonrepresentational scaffolds 
need not be interpreted by the user as referring to something else.
Overall, then, what place in the taxonomy an object occupies will 
depend on whether or not the user interprets it; and if so, how. The 
wedding ring, for example, will function as a symbolic affective scaf-
12 It may be asked whether some affective responses or some affective uses of objects 
are more appropriate than others. What counts as an ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ 
affective response or use is an orthogonal issue (and a complex one) that I do not in-
tend to address here. My aim here is just to describe a widespread psychological phe-
nomenon – namely, that people can interpret objects in different ways and that these 
different interpretations often determine different affective responses to those objects.
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fold when it is interpreted according to convention as referring to a 
commitment to faithfulness. The same user could, however, relate to 
the wedding ring in a different way – perhaps as a memento of when 
the ring was put on her finger during the wedding ceremony. In this 
case the ring will function as an indexical affective scaffold (and, im-
portantly, in virtue of this different interpretation it could elicit differ-
ent affective states). Or, the same wedding ring could affect the user 
in virtue of its sensory qualities (e.g. shininess, heaviness) without 
being taken to refer to anything else – in which case it will function 
as a nonrepresentational sensory affective scaffold. In fact, I often 
wear my wedding ring because of the physical comfort I get from feel-
ing something around my finger – a comfort I get from wearing rings 
more generally. Or consider pizza again. I like to make pizza every 
Sunday night during the damp and dark winter months, to cheer me 
up. This activity brings me joy and comfort through its multisenso-
riality – the changing and intensifying scent as the pizza bakes, and 
all the many other sensory pleasures that accompany eating pizza. 
The pizza is also a psychoactive scaffold in virtue of its high carb con-
tent. Additionally, making pizza is for me a way of retaining a sense 
of identity. I have been making pizza on Sunday nights since I was 
a university student, and I have fond memories associated with con-
viviality when I make and eat it. My pizza thus also functions as an 
indexical affective scaffold. Similarly, a cigarette functions not on-
ly as a psychoactive affective scaffold (although it probably always 
does in smokers, unless it contains no nicotine); smokers often say 
they enjoy various sensory aspects of smoking (such as holding the 
cigarette in their hand and mouth). In the context of ritual, the pe-
yote works as a psychoactive and symbolic affective scaffold. A pic-
ture of one’s parents can be an iconic but also an indexical and sen-
sory affective scaffold. And so on. In sum, token objects do not fall 
under just one taxon [fig. 4].
Importantly, some uses of objects as affective scaffolds will be deter-
mined primarily by sociocultural norms and expectations, while others 
by personal history. In Western cultures, to interpret a wedding ring as 
a symbol of commitment to faithfulness is in line with sociocultural ex-
pectations. In fact, the wedding ceremony is arguably structured pre-
cisely to ‘inscribe’ such meaning into the rings – with the rings being 
exchanged just after the pronunciation of the vows. Alongside these so-
cioculturally mediated interpretations, however, there can be a range 
of other, more idiosyncratic interpretations. In my particular case, my 
wedding ring also often makes me giggle, as it reminds me of a joke 
my husband made on our wedding day about our rings.
A related implication of this understanding of the taxonomy is that 
what type of affective scaffold an object is will also depend on indi-
vidual differences among users. In spite of some commonalities (e.g. 
most if not all humans like sugar, salt and fat), we generally develop 
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personal preferences for certain sensory stimuli and activities, and 
have different aims, concerns, personalities and so on. The same ob-
ject will thus function as a different type of affective scaffold for dif-
ferent people, and even function as a scaffold for one person but not 
for another. People have different tastes when it comes to home décor, 
for example (some are minimalists, others maximalists); some find 
sacred music uplifting, others boring; some like to wear small rings, 
some big ones, some many ones, and others fewer or none; some find 
ironing relaxing, others loathe it, and so on.
Finally, individual differences in training and personal history will 
also determine how people relate to objects. Of course, only some 
people learn to use certain objects for affective regulatory purpos-
es (as in the case of musical instruments). Less obviously, how peo-
ple relate to objects also depends on whether and how they pay at-
tention to objects and to how objects affect them. Our sensitivity to 
things is not unalterable. Appreciation can be trained and cultivat-
ed, and not just for ‘highbrow’ art and objects such as fine wines. We 
know from mindfulness practices that we can change our stance to-
ward everyday objects and activities, and thereby change how these 
affect us (e.g. Bays 2009). How much training one has in these prac-
tices will then influence how one is affected by objects. Likewise for 
cultural norms, that also determine how people relate to and are af-
fected by objects. In Japan, for example, the cultural centrality of the 
aesthetic quality of wabi (impermanence and imperfection) will in-
fluence how people relate to, look at and appreciate certain objects.
To come full circle, what about Heersmink’s taxonomy of cogni-
tive artefacts? Is it appropriate to regard it as ‘artefact-based’? This 
Figure 4 The same object can function as a different type of affective scaffold.
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question requires a longer elaboration than I have room for here. 
Briefly, it seems to me that a taxonomy of cognitive artefacts cannot 
entirely bracket the user (see also Fasoli 2018). For an artefact to be 
cognitive in the first place it means that it is used to aid some cogni-
tive/epistemic process, which will depend on the user’s goals, skill, 
level of cognitive development, and so on. Thus, if the ultimate aim 
of taxonomizing artefacts is to explain how they aid cognition, then 
it seems that more attention will need to be paid to the user too, in 
various respects.
6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a taxonomy of affective scaffolds, starting 
from Heersmink’s (2013) taxonomy of cognitive artefacts. This exer-
cise has produced various insights that I hope are valuable for fur-
ther developing the emerging situated approach to affectivity. The 
original taxonomy had to be tweaked a bit, and may be so again. Yet 
along the way we are gaining more detailed conceptual resources for 
spelling out why we surround ourselves with objects, and why and 
how we use them and develop practices and activities including them. 
The present analysis has highlighted that objects are complex things 
which can affect us in many different ways in virtue of their materi-
al properties as well as of what we take them to refer to. Important-
ly, objects can have such different effects on us because we are com-
plex historical and enculturated bodily beings with the capacity not 
only to be directly affected by objects as material things, but also to 
associate these objects with something beyond themselves.
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